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Abstract
This paper examines Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (QJE 1997)’s
specification of the threat point under private ownership.
Their threat point, unilaterally determined by a party with
the right to control all assets in production, cannot be jus-
tified by the existing theories of optimal threat. A pair of
the separation strategy (the maximin strategy) is rather a
natural candidate for the optimal threat in the spirit of co-
operative games including Nash bargaining solution. In the
case of pubic goods, bargaining emerges from skills specific
to some elements in the relationship rather than to assets in
production even if a private firm has the right to control all
assets. In other cases, unilateral determination of the threat
point implies ex post monopoly of the private firm after spe-
cific investments, in spite of ex ante competitive auction of
the contract. The latter situation is contradictory to the nec-
essary condition for success of privatization.
Key Words: Privatization, Incomplete Contract, Property
Rights Approach, Threat Point in Bargaining, Relationship
Specific Investments
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1 Introduction
Privatization has been one of controversial topics for the past
three decades. Starting from dividing and divesting natural
monopoly ﬁrms to the general public to ”denationalization”
of ﬁrms in the former socialist economies as well as strate-
gic industry companies in developing countries, to contract-
ing out of public services, market mechanism now covers sig-
niﬁcant part of the goods and services used to be provided
directly by governments. The primary purpose of privatiza-
tion is said to be to improve economic eﬃciency. However,
recent empirical research does not necessarily conﬁrm the in-
tention of privatization policy. For example, Florio (2004),
reviewing British privatization, points out that the results
of empirical research are mixed rather than supporting pri-
vatization. Furthermore many economists, including those
aggressive proposers of privatization, have emphasized that
privatization per se does not improve eﬃciency and that it is
necessary that competition exists and works well after priva-
tization.1
1Some authors in OECD (2000) recommend that privatization and
competition need to be pursued in tandem with appropriate regulatory
policies. Andrew Shleifer, in Foreword of Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes
(2005), says ”[I]n the case where privatizations failed, the problems ap-
pear to be linked to continued state involvement and regulation - - -
improved corporate governance and regulatory environment are com-
plementary to privatization.” Though Shleifer criticizes government in-
tervention, what ”improved regulatory environment” means is surely
competition after privatization. Joseph Stiglitz, in Foreword of Roland
(2008), iterates Sappington & Stiglitz (1987)’s message that ”the only
conditions under which privatization could be guaranteed to be an eﬀec-
tive way of implementing social objectives are precisely the same condi-
tions under which markets are Pareto eﬃcient.”
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This state of ambiguous results and missing theoretical
elements suggests that it is worthwhile to examine an eco-
nomic theory of privatization. This paper is such an attempt
to investigate the underlying logic and presumptions of the
representative theory, by focusing on the property rights ap-
proach to privatization. This approach emphasizes and pre-
sumes that allocation of the property rights aﬀects payoﬀs of
a threat point in bargaining after relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments. This paper tries to clarify two logical implications of
the property rights approach: either that allocation of the
property right has no eﬀect on the payoﬀs of the threat point
or that ex post competition after relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments is not guaranteed.
In this paper, I refer to privatization as the case of con-
tracting out the public goods services. The reason why I
restrict the word privatization to a narrow case is two fold.
When it comes to privatization, it covers a variety of sit-
uation. In some cases such as privatization in the former
socialist economies and developing countries, it seems obvi-
ous that privatization is preferred, since the targeted goods
are private goods and government failures (due to corrup-
tion) are enormous. The reader, with these cases in mind,
would be likely to reject any argument against privatization.
In order to clearly state conditions for success or failure of
privatization, we focus on more controversial cases in devel-
oped countries, especially contracting out of public services.
The case of contracting out is on the increase and still con-
tentious while many natural monopoly ﬁrms have been pri-
vatized. Furthermore, the typical case of privatization in the
U.S. is contracting out of public services. (See Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997).) Thus we refer to the case
of contracting out of public services as privatization.
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The reason for limiting the analysis to the case of con-
tracting out public goods services is that some theories of
privatization are proposed to be able to apply to the case
of public goods. It is commonplace in textbooks that pub-
lic goods are non-excludable so that market fails to provide
them. It seems new and provocative to propose that market
(or a private ﬁrm) can provide for public goods through the
form of contracting out. Thus we concentrate the analysis on
the case of public goods services, though we refer to the cases
of excludable goods and services when they are relevant.
Among the theories of privatization, we choose Hart, Shleifer
& Vishny (1997) as the representative model to examine.
As Sappington & Stiglitz (1987) point out, the benevolent
planner of government theoretically (ideally) can achieve eﬃ-
ciency by auctioning oﬀ the right to produce the public goods
service in question under complete contract. This leads some
economists to employ an incomplete contract model. Among
such economists2, the above three authors have actively pro-
posed privatization based on their property rights approach.
Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) makes a comparison of in-
house provision by government with contracting-out, and ap-
plies its implications to one of the most inconceivable case of
privatization, that is, prison. We will scrutinize Hart, Shleifer
& Vishny (1997)’s model, looking into other related work by
those and other authors if necessary.
The essence of Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model
lies in their presumption that who has the right to control
over assets in production aﬀects the threat point payoﬀs in
bargaining after relationship speciﬁc investments. Under the
2Other economists who take an incomplete contract approach are
Schmidt (1996) and Laﬀont & Tirole (1993).
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presumption, shares of bargaining are diﬀerent between pri-
vate and public ownerships, and so are the levels of relation-
ship speciﬁc investments. This makes performance diﬀerent,
with more cost reduction and less quality improvement under
private ownership.3
My doubt comes from opaque speciﬁcation of the threat
point in Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model. In coop-
erative games such as Nash bargaining solution, the optimal
threat strategy is regarded as a player’s maxi-min strategy,
which can be brought by his separation from the relationship
and by taking his best outside opportunity. The three au-
thors seem to employ a diﬀerent speciﬁcation under private
ownership, where government has eventually no bargaining
power, since a private ﬁrm has the right to control both non-
human and human assets, according to their presumption.
I will point out that relationship speciﬁc investments may
make human assets (or skills) speciﬁc to various elements in
the relation such as customers, local geographical areas, and
team members. When human assets are speciﬁc to at least
one of these elements over which the property right to con-
trol cannot be exercised directly, a party without the property
right to assets can be able to do harm to the other party by
dissolving the relationship and thus have bargaining power.
Therefore the payoﬀs of the threat point induced by the sepa-
ration strategy are players’ best outside opportunities, which
are independent of allocation of the property rights to pro-
ductive assets. This implies that it may not matter who has
the property right to control which assets.4
3The diﬀerence partly results from a problem of multi-task incentive
(Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991)) ; too strong incentive to attach to cost
reduction under private ownership.
4Segal & Whinston (2000) show the same irrelevant result, assuming
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If the three authors’ presumption was right and govern-
ment had no bargaining power under private ownership, the
government would never have any inﬂuence on the private
ﬁrm within the contract after relationship speciﬁc invest-
ments, unless it exercises its authoritative power to inter-
vene into (or regulate) the private ﬁrm. This implies that
the government will lose power to control the private ﬁrm af-
ter relationship speciﬁc investments and let the private ﬁrm
be eventually a monopoly of the public goods with subsidy.
This situation is contradictory to the requirement for suc-
cessful privatization of ex post competition after privatiza-
tion. Therefore Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model ends
up with either no diﬀerence of performance between the two
types of ownership or ex post monopoly of the private ﬁrm.
Whichever case happens, their model is far from justifying
privatization and comparing private with public ownerships.
Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model introduces one
more complication. The three authors assume that the gov-
ernment, under public ownership, can capture part of the
beneﬁt generated by (speciﬁc) investments even in the case
of separation. This is the case where payoﬀs of their threat
point depend on past investments, which are not completely
speciﬁc. It is easily shown that this complication does not
aﬀect levels of speciﬁc investments and thus performance be-
tween private and public ownerships, once we formulate the
threat point as the situation of outside opportunity brought
about by separation from the relationship.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we outline Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model and
an exclusive contract in which a party can prevent the other party from
trading with a third party outside the relation.
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make sure their speciﬁcation of the threat point in bargaining.
In Section 3, we discuss how the optimal threat in bargaining
is considered in the literature of game theory. We point out
what elements other than assets in production know-hows
and skills are speciﬁc to, brieﬂy reviewing the literature of
speciﬁc skills in Section 4. In Section 5, we try to clarify
what is wrong with Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model,
based on our arguments in the preceding sections. The last
section concludes by pointing out the remaining problems
and issues.
2 Threat Point of Hart, Shleifer & Vishny
(1997)’s Model and Its Problems
We take Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)’s model (hereafter
abbreviated as HSV model) as the representative one of the
property rights approach to privatization. The HSV model
compares private ownership (government contracting-out to
a private ﬁrm) with public ownership (in-house provision by
government with its employee) under an incomplete contract
situation, emphasizing on residual control rights over assets
in production. Its application to prison is also extensively
discussed. The paper was published after a series of papers
and books on related issues of the property rights approach to
ﬁrms and privatization.5 It is safe to say that the HSV model
is the most appropriate one for examining how property rights
would aﬀect performance of private and public ownerships.
5For example, Grossman & Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1990),
Shleifer & Vishny (1994), Hart (1995), Shleifer (1998) and Besley &
Ghatak (2001).
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We will focus on how payoﬀs in the threat point are speciﬁed
in the HSV model.
2.1 Outlines of HSV’s model
The basic setting of the HSV model, simpliﬁed for later ex-
positions, is as follows. There are only two kinds of cap-
ital, human and physical ones, necessary for providing the
service in question.6 A worker, government employee under
public ownership or self-employed ﬁrm under private own-
ership,7 makes speciﬁc investments into both cost reduction
and quality improvement. These investments are not veriﬁ-
able so that they are not speciﬁed in a contract at the initial
stage when the contract is signed. A bargaining over shares
of the investment yield is inevitable between the worker and
the government after the investments are sunk.8 The contract
is agreed on in a competitive manner at the initial stage so
that a transfer between the two parties makes a worker or
a self-employed ﬁrm indiﬀerent to his best outside opportu-
nity. The worker and the self-employed ﬁrm are utility and
6In this paper, I use capitals and assets exchangeably, depending on
the contexts.
7If the private ﬁrm has an employment relation with its workers,
there will emerge a bargaining between the private ﬁrm’s manager and
its workers after speciﬁc investments, in addition to bargaining between
the government and the private ﬁrm. To avoid this complication, we
interpret a private ﬁrm as self-empolyed one.
8Actually the HSV model is not clear about whether these invest-
ments are sunk or not because the HSV model assumes a bargaining
situation on one hand and allows the self-employed ﬁrm to re-adjust its
quality investment in a bargaining stage on the other hand. However,
we assume sunk investments. Otherwise we will not be able to assume
a bargaining situation and to focus on how allocation of the property
rights would aﬀect bargaining outcomes.
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proﬁt maximizers, respectively. (The self-employed ﬁrm are
not interested in quality since it is not written in the con-
tract.) The government is a benevolent planner maximizing
the diﬀerence between the beneﬁt (including quality) from
the service and its cost. Under private ownership, the self-
employed ﬁrm has the right to control both his human and
physical capitals. Under public ownership, the worker has
the right to control his human capital, while the government
has the right to control its physical capital.
The HSV model’s key assumption is that allocation of
the right to control capitals (assets) aﬀects payoﬀs in the
case of bargaining breakdown. Since the HSV model assumes
Nash bargaining solution to analyze bargaining outcomes, the
threat (default) payoﬀ levels are very crucial to their analysis.
However, the HSV’s explanation seems opaque about how
the threat point payoﬀs are derived. In reference to related
papers with the same bargaining structure, I ﬁgure out how
the threat point payoﬀs are speciﬁed in the HSV model as
follows in the next subsection.
2.2 Threat Point Specification and Its Problems
There are two kinds of asymmetry between private and pub-
lic ownerships. One is asymmetry on how the parties could
bring about the threat point situation. Under private own-
ership, the self-employed ﬁrm is described as the only party
that can unilaterally determine the threat point situation, as
long as the other party keeps its reservation utility. This in-
terpretation can be justiﬁed since (a) the HSV’s model allows
the self-employed ﬁrm to re-adjust its quality investment as
9
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it likes in their explanation of the threat and (b) Shleifer &
Vishny (1994, p.1003) derives the threat point from a politi-
cian’s utility maximization subject to a manager’s reservation
utility constraint in the case of the politician having control
rights over all variables. This unilateral determination of the
threat point comes from the observation in the case of ﬁrm
integration that a ﬁrm with the property rights of all assets
in production has unilateral and exclusive power to control
both assets and ﬂows of incomes as long as the other ﬁrm is
guaranteed its reservation proﬁt.9 Under public ownership,
on the other hand, when the parties fail to agree, each party
can separate from each other and take its outside opportunity.
Because technological complementarity between human and
physical capitals, the separation causes losses to both par-
ties (compared with the yield under their cooperation), and
determines the threat point payoﬀs in bargaining. The asym-
metry of unilateral vs bilateral determination of the threat
point is summarized as follows. Note that a party has even-
tually no bargaining power if the other party can unilaterally
determine the threat point.
(A1) If a party has the property rights (control rights) over
both human and physical capitals (as in the case of private
9In the context of ﬁrm integration, Hart (1995, pp.35-38) exogenously
assumes a general functional form of the threat point payoﬀs that depend
on allocation of the property rights, without further explanation. Hart
& Moore (1990) also exogenously assume that a characteristic function
of any coalition depends on what assets the coalition can control. Hart
(1995, p.43, footnote 20) seems to think that the no-trade payoﬀs (his
threat point payoﬀs) are diﬀerent from the outside opportunity payoﬀs.
See De Meza & Lockwood (1998) for an alternative interpretation of the
no-trade payoﬀs as their inside option in the context of alternate-oﬀer
models. In their interpretation, bargaining surplus should have been
just redeﬁned since their given threat point is changed by their inside
option.
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ownership), the other party has no bargaining power (and
the first party has).
(A2) If either party has the property rights (control rights)
over at least one capital (as in the case of public ownership),
both parties have bargaining power.
The other asymmetry between two types of ownership is
incomplete specificity of human capital assumed only in the
case of public onwerhsip. The party with the property right
of physical capital can retain at least part of the yield from
the investments without the other party’s cooperation, that
is, even after the parties separate from each other. Since the
government under public ownership can retain part of the
yield of the investments by hiring other outside workers, this
part of human capital must be general rather than specific.
The asymmetry of incomplete specificity is summarized as as
follows.
(A3) Under public ownership, part of the yield of the in-
vestment into human capital comes from general skills and
can be retained in the hand of the owner of physical capi-
tal (who has the right to control it) even after the contract
relation is broken down and both parties are separated.
A few comments on the two kinds of asymmetry are in
order. Unilateral determination of the threat point raises a
serious problem. As in the above summary, the party without
the control right over any capital (government under private
ownership) has eventually no bargaining power because the
party with the control right over all capitals can unilaterally
push down the other party’s utility to its reservation level
at the beginning of bargaining before negotiation. This im-
1
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plies that there is no bargaining surplus that the parties can
share.10 But the HSV assumes Nash bargaining solution and
applies it to the unilaterally determined threat point under
private ownership. I do not intend to blame the HSV for
this inconsistency because we have neither convincing the-
ory of optimal threat in bargaining nor concrete argument of
the sources of bargaining power in the case of speciﬁc human
capital. We will review and discuss these topics in the next
two sections, respectively.
Incomplete speciﬁcity of human capital is itself not im-
plausible. Implicit knowledge and knowhow of workers are
in some cases imbedded in the physical capitals such as ma-
chinery, say, in the form of modiﬁed specs as workers manage
to operate it through trial and error. It will turn out that
it is crucial whether or not incomplete speciﬁcity aﬀects the
threat point payoﬀs in the same way under both types of own-
ership when the contract is dissolved. When human capital
is speciﬁc to physical capitals, incomplete speciﬁcity under
private ownership is not relevant since the self-employed ﬁrm
has the rights to control both human and physical capitals
as the HSV presumes. As we will see, however, a variety of
factors may cause human skills speciﬁc to a variety of things,
not only to physical capitals. There might be the case where
the separation would cause losses of the yield resulting from
speciﬁc human capital for both parties under whichever own-
ership. In such a case, incomplete speciﬁcity aﬀects the threat
payoﬀs in the same way under both public and private own-
erships. We will return to this issue in the ﬁnal section.
10This might be a reason why the HSV carefully uses a phrase ”in
the absence of renegotiation” (Italic original) instead of the threat point.
But the HSV uses the same phrase in the case of public ownership where
the threat point is determined bilaterally by the separation.
1
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3 Optimal Threat of Bargaining in the
Literature
The threat point has been assumed ﬁxed or given in many
bargaining theories since Nash (1950). In some contexts such
as a bargaining between a seller and a buyer in a large mar-
ketplace, it is obvious what would happen if both parties
did not agree on price; each would go to another trader. In
other contexts such as wage bargaining between management
and labor union, it really matters what strategy each player
would take in disagreement, since there are many strategies
available; for example, how long a strike (lock-out) to com-
mit. Furthermore, it has been known since Nash (1953) that
threat payoﬀ levels crucially aﬀect bargaining outcomes. We
need the theory of optimal threat in bargaining. However,
there are only some scattered arguments of optimal threat.
In this section, we review these arguments according to Myer-
son (1991)’s brief explanation, and discuss what formulation
we should take as the threat point of Nash bargaining solu-
tion.11
11Alternate-oﬀer models of bargaining eventually assume away the
problem of optimal threat into inﬁnite future. Even if outside options
are assumed available during their negotiation process, it does not mean
analyzing optimal threats because an outside option works as a con-
straint on equilibrium paths if it aﬀects bargaining outcomes. So we do
not take a position to interpret Nash bargaining solution as a substitute
for an alternate-oﬀer game with outside options. Neither do we discuss
the papers (Chiu (1998) and De Meza & Lockwood (1998) ) based on
outside options as a constraint in alternate-oﬀer models.
1
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3.1 Three Theories of threat a` la Myerson (1991)
Myerson (1991, pp.388-89) brieﬂy discusses three theories
of threat and disagreement in the underlying strategic form
game Γ (from which the feasible set of bargaining in the co-
operative game is derived). We take strategy sets of the un-
derlying game as broad as possible including separation and
damage strategies, as long as they are physically possible.
The ﬁrst theory is to take a non-cooperative Nash equilib-
rium of Γ. The second is to take a pair of the min-max
strategy. The third is to commit to a single strategy in Γ
before the cooperative game is played.
The ﬁrst theory regards a game after disagreement as
the same underlying strategic form game of bargaining (non-
cooperative game) and applies Nash equilibrium to it. Ex
post threat game should be treated as non-coopertive game
since there is no room for cooperation after an impasse of
bargaining. However, there are many Nash equilibria in this
threat game, as in Nash’s demand game. Not only a pair of
the separation strategy but also all Pareto-optimal and indi-
vidually rational pairs of strategy are equilibria. Note that
a pair of the separation strategy is equilibrium because it is
optimal to separate and take the best outside opportunity as
long as the other player takes the separation strategy. This
theory seems useless because it does not pin down a unique
thereat point.
The second theory also regards the game after disagree-
ment in the same way as the ﬁrst one and can be justiﬁed
(perhaps) by analogy with a player’s minimax value as his
reservation utility (individually rational payoﬀ) in the Folk
1
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Theorem.12 A player’s payoﬀ is at least his minimax value
in any equilibrium of the stage game and in any Nash equi-
librium of the repeated game, regardless of the level of the
discount factor. Though a pair of minimax strategy is unique,
it might be diﬃcult to justify as the optimal (rational) threat
point in the context of non-cooperative games because it as-
sumes too a pessimistic view of the opponent’s behavior.
The third theory originates from Nash (1953)’s optimal
threat theory. He assumes that each player commits to choose
a particular strategy in the underlying strategic form game
and that the pair of these strategies are automatically imple-
mented whenever bargaining breaks down. This ex ante com-
mitment allows Nash to be able to solve the optimal threat
game in a noncooperative way, based on the backward in-
duction, using the reduced payoﬀs that are functions of the
committed threat strategies. A labor union may commit itself
to going on a strike in case of disagreement with management
through a collective decision at its members’ meeting in ad-
vance. However, it is not always the case that each player can
make a commitment to a particular strategy as the threat one
before bargaining starts. It seems to me diﬃcult to conceive
a commitment device in the contracts in question. Applica-
bility of the threat theory of ex ante commitment is limited.
12A player’s minimax value in the Folk Theorem is deﬁned as the low-
est payoﬀ his opponents can hold him to by any choice of their strategies,
provided that the player correctly foresees a combination of his oppo-
nents’ strategies and plays a best response to it.
1
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3.2 Maximin Strategy as a Threat a` la Luce &
Raiﬀa (1957)
There is the fourth theory of optimal threat in addition to
the above three theories. Luce & Raiﬀa (1957, p.118) pro-
poses a player’s maximin strategy as his optimal threat, in
the spirit of cooperative games. The characteristic function
(classical one) of a coalition in cooperative games is deﬁned
as the coalition’s maximin value derived from the underlying
non-coperative strategic form game. In the case of two-person
cooperative games, the characteristic function of one-person
coalition is the payoﬀ he could guarantee himself if the other
player takes her strategy minimizing his payoﬀ, that is, the
maximin value. It is natural in cooperative games to inter-
pret the disagreement situation in two-person bargaining as
the situation where a coalition is divided into individual one-
person coalitions. Since Nash bargaining solution is a cooper-
ative game solution, a pair of maximin strategy as the threat
point is consistent with the solution. It is safe to say that
the maximin strategy is a candidate for the optimal threat
strategy when Nash bargaining solution (or any of other co-
operative solutions) is adopted.
3.3 The Separation Strategy as the Optimal Threat
None of the above theories is completely satisfactory. Nonethe-
less, none of them derives the HSV’s unilateral determina-
tion of the threat point under private ownership because the
above theories suppose bilateral determination of the threat.
On the other hand, whatever theory we adopt, a pair of the
separation strategy is not only a Nash equilibrium in the ex
1
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post threat game as well as in the ex ante commitment game
but also a pair of the minimax strategy as well as a pair of
maximin strategy. It is optimal for a player to commit to the
separation strategy if his opponent commits to the separation
strategy because he could not get more than his best outside
opportunity. It is a best response for a player to take the
separation strategy and secure his best outside opportunity
if his opponent chooses a strategy doing excessive damage to
him. It would maximize a player’s payoﬀ to take the sepa-
ration strategy if the other player chose a strategy lowering
his payoﬀ down below his best outside opportunity. A pair
of the separation strategy seems natural as the threat point
in the bargaining situations, as long as each party can take
the separation strategy in the case of disagreement.
From the viewpoint of optimal threat in bargaining, I sus-
pect that HSV’s unilateral determination of the threat point
under private ownership is an appropriate formulation of the
situation in question. On the other hand, the HSV’s asser-
tion appears plausible at ﬁrst glance that the self-employed
ﬁrm has the right to control all capitals (assets) so that the
government has no control (bargaining) power. I will dis-
cuss in the next section that there are some cases of speciﬁc
human capital in which the government under private own-
ership could have bargaining power through exercising the
separation strategy in case of disagreement.
1
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4 Relationship Specificity and Bargain-
ing Power
The concept of relationship speciﬁc assets originates from
Becker (1975)’s ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital. Training (in-
vestment in human capital) that increases productivity more
in ﬁrms providing it than in other ﬁrms is called ﬁrm speciﬁc
training (Becker (1975, p. 26)). Skills acquired through such
training are called ﬁrm speciﬁc skills and workers accumu-
lating such skills ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital. If either ﬁrm
speciﬁc workers leave their ﬁrm or the ﬁrm layoﬀs these work-
ers, both will lose a higher joint yield of speciﬁc investment
than the yield they would earn otherwise (with other work-
ers or other ﬁrms). This is the reason why bargaining arises
from the relationship speciﬁc assets.13 In this section, by
discussing where speciﬁcity comes from and to what element
skills (or assets) are speciﬁc, we will show that bargaining
can emerge between the parties even if one of them has the
right to control all assets in production.
4.1 Skills Specific to Elements Other Than As-
sets in Production
There are several kinds of causes of ﬁrm speciﬁc skills, though
Becker (1975, p. 26) says that much of on-the-job training is
more or less ﬁrm speciﬁc.14 Conditions of product and labor
markets may create a situation in which Becker’s deﬁnition
13This also alludes to a wrong specification of unilateral determination
of the threat point under private ownership in the HSV’s model.
14We exclude a ”friction” in transaction such as hiring costs from the
possible causes of specific skills. Furthermore the following argument
1
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is satisﬁed, without any technological complementarity nor
on-the-job training. If a ﬁrm is a monopoly in its industry,
any skill used only in the industry is speciﬁc to the ﬁrm.
Much of military training of astronauts, ﬁghter pilots, and
missile men fall into this category. If a ﬁrm is only one in
serving a geographically local area and its labor market is
geographically separated, any skill speciﬁc to the industry the
ﬁrm belongs to turns out to be speciﬁc to the ﬁrm. When an
employer or ﬁrm is in a position of monopoly or monopsony,
any industry specific skill can be ﬁrm speciﬁc.
The relationship speciﬁcity in the literature other than la-
bor economics results from the technology necessary for spe-
cialization or product diﬀerentiation. This case appears in
the form of technological complementarity between assets in
production. General Motors developed the cars that are ﬁt-
ted to the bodies supplied by Fisher Body, while Fisher Body
made its assembly lines specialize in GM’s cars. A railroad
connecting between an inland coal mine and a port is spe-
ciﬁc to both the mine and the railroad, though this case is
referred to site speciﬁcity (Joskow (1987)) because the assets
in question are technologically attached to speciﬁc sites. In
these examples, assets are speciﬁc to each other (or indirectly
through a third element such as sites).
Relationships between a worker and his customers easily
become ﬁrm speciﬁc as long as both the worker and his cus-
tomers stay and transact in the ﬁrm. This is especially the
case when provided services are personalized. Trust is de-
veloped between a physician and his patients and facilitates
medical treatments, though medical records are available to
does not exhaust all causes of firm specific skills. I discuss only relevant
ones to the later arguments.
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other physicians. A similar relationship may develop between
a hospital and primary care physicians who refer patients to
the hospital. Rehabilitation of inmates would be eﬀective
only when trust is established between a counselor and her
inmates. Part of skills and ability to provide high quality
of service are speciﬁc to ”customers” (patients, primary care
doctors, and inmates, respectively).
Whenever cooperation among workers is necessary for high
quality services, skills developed there involve elements spe-
ciﬁc to particular workers there. Order in a prison would
be able to be maintained not only by a relationship between
guards and inmates but also by a teamwork among the guards.
Some skills are speciﬁc to a particular geographical area
where the service is provided. An experienced bus driver in a
big city is familiar to bus routs and traﬃc conditions so that
he can safely operate a bus service on time. Military exercises
conducted surrounding the territory make soldiers’ combat
ability or knowhow speciﬁc to a particular geographical area
around the territory.
In some cases, skills are speciﬁc to assets in production in a
particular ﬁrm. In other cases, skills are speciﬁc to something
else in the relationship such as customers or geographical ar-
eas. Furthermore ﬁrm speciﬁcity may result from a de facto
monopolistic market condition. Note that actual skills spe-
ciﬁc to a particular ﬁrm may be brought by a combination
of these diﬀerent causes. For example, the relationship speci-
ﬁcity accruing from rehabilitation of maximum-security in-
mates and order in their prison are reinforced by the prison’s
specialization in maximum-security inmates because there is
usually only one prison of maximum-security inmates in a
2
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country.15
4.2 Bargaining emerges from Specificity to Ele-
ments other than Assets in the Relationship
We have illustrated some cases in which skills are speciﬁc
to some elements other than assets in production. It follows
from this observation that bargaining can emerge between the
parties even if one of them has the right to control all assets
in production. In other words, the government could have
bargaining power by exercising the separation strategy, even
under the private ownership where the self-empolyed ﬁrm
has the right to control both human and physical capitals,
contrary to the presumption of the HSV’s model. This sug-
gests that the threat point brought about by the separation
strategy may make no diﬀerence between private and public
ownerships, which denies the essential point of the property
rights approach. This is because a party’s best outside op-
portunity (the opportunity cost of its all assets as general
capitals, which is evaluated through their competitive mar-
kets) is independent of how property rights are allocated in
the ﬁrm. Let us investigate robustness of the HSV’s presump-
tion in more detail in the next section.
15The contents of prison services vary from country to country. So I
ignore an oversea opportunity for private prison firms to operate inter-
nationally, though there are a few companies doing businesses beyond
the borders.
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5 How Robust is Hart, Shleifer & Vishny
(1997)’s Model?
We have so far shown in the preceding sections (1) that a
pair of the separation strategy is a natural candidate for the
optimal threat point when Nash bargaining solution is ap-
plied and (2) that even under private ownership of the HSV’s
model, bargaining can arise from the fact that human skills
are specific to some other elements than assets in produc-
tion. In this section, we examine under exactly what condi-
tions bargaining would emerge under private ownership of the
HSV’s model. We also discuss what would happen if the gov-
ernment had no bargaining power under private ownership as
HSV presumes, since the HSV’s unilateral determination of
the threat point implies that no bargaining would take place
in contrary to the HSV’s model. From these arguments we
draw implications for the HSV’ model as a theory of privati-
zation.
In order to examine whether or not the government would
have bargaining power under private ownership, we strategi-
cally assume that the government never exercises its mighty
legal power to hurt the self-employed firm by revoking li-
censes, restricting operations and so on (within the extent of
bureaucratic discretion). Otherwise the government will be
able to have bargaining power against the firm irrespective
of allocation of property rights. In other words, we assume
that the government honors the incomplete contract and acts
within it.
2
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5.1 The Case of Public Goods with Specificity
to Elements other than Assets in the Rela-
tionship
We first focus on the case of public goods as a candidate
for the situation where specificity to something other than
assets in production leads to bargaining even under private
ownership. When public goods are contracted out, we had
better keep in mind two important features from the view-
point of whether bargaining would occur or not.16 First, the
government is a monopoly of the public goods and a monop-
sony of its contracting-out in a local or national area. Sec-
ond, a private firm cannot provide the public goods without
government subsidy through the contracting-out because of
non-excludability of public goods.
Suppose that skills are specific to customers or a particular
geographical area in the contracting-out of the public goods.
When the relationship is dissolved, the self-empolyed firm
cannot bring its customers together to go to another govern-
ment contract-out. This is because most customers live in the
jurisdiction where the self-employed firm could be no longer
allowed to operate and nor be able to earn positive profits
without government subsidy. Since the self-employed firm’s
best outside opportunity is to win a contract and provide
the public goods in another area or to engage in providing
a private (or excludable) goods, the firm’s skills specific to
the geographical area would be no longer useful. For exam-
16Besley & Ghatak (2001) consider ownership issues for public goods,
looking at the demand side eﬀects of non-excludability and non-rivalry
on their disagreement payoﬀs. We focus on the supply side eﬀects of
public goods characteristics on how much proﬁt a private ﬁrm could
earn in case of an impasse.
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ple, the number and composition of inmates in a prison are
under control of government. Mercenaries having fought in
Afghanistan are less eﬀective in Haiti. Government has bar-
gaining power in the contracting-out of public goods if skills
are speciﬁc to something other than assets in production.
This argument, however, does not necessarily go well in
the case of excludable goods. The self-employed ﬁrm could
provide the same goods and services as a private ﬁrm in the
same jurisdiction to which its customers and community-
related elements are speciﬁc. The positive proﬁt thus earned
may not be lower than the proﬁt under the contracting-out.17
For example, a hospital, separating from the contracting-out,
could keep its customers together with their list and operate
successfully as a private hospital in the same region. A bus
company, retaining its drivers familiar to routs and traﬃc
conditions with the right to operate these routs, could con-
tinue to operate in the same area as proﬁtably as before, after
breaking the contracting-out. In these cases, the separation
strategy triggered by the government is not eﬀective at all as
a threat in bargaining.
If skills are speciﬁc to assets in production but nothing
else, the government has no bargaining power whether or not
goods are excludable, as we interpreted the case of private
ownership in the HSV’s model. In summary, when skills are
speciﬁc to something not under control of the self-employed
ﬁrm in the case of contracting out of public goods, the govern-
ment has bargaining power through exercising its separation
strategy in case of disagreement. In other cases, the govern-
17The diﬀerence of proﬁt might be large enough to make the separation
strategy eﬀective as a threat one. We ignore this possibility in order to
make our argument clear and simpler.
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ment has no bargaining power.
5.2 Ex Post Monopoly under Private Ownership
Unilateral determination of the threat point under private
ownership in the HSV’s model implies that the government
has no bargaining power, as we interpreted in the preceding
sections. However, HSV applies Nash bargaining solution to
the threat point unilaterally determined by the self-employed
ﬁrm. This appears inconsistent. Exactly what would happen
in this case?
The government is assumed to act within the incomplete
contract with the self-employed ﬁrm. Since the contract is
incomplete, many important items are not written. When-
ever an unwritten issue happens, the self-employed ﬁrm has
the right to decide about it because of his property right
to control all assets in production. This implies that the
government has eventually no measure to control and even
aﬀect behavior of the self-employed ﬁrm, as time goes on
after the contract. Quality, non-contractible item, will be
down to the level where the government would be indiﬀer-
ent between the self-employed ﬁrm and a potential entrant.
The self-empolyed ﬁrm will charge higher prices if they (or
price formula) are not speciﬁed in a (long run) contract due
to uncertainty in the future. Unless an eﬀective regulation
on behavior of the self-empoyed ﬁrm is enacted before the
contract, the self-employed ﬁrm will have a broad range of
discretion over its action, and become a de facto monopoly
in providing the goods in question. This feature is reinforced
by increasing returns to scale because the government can-
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not ensure ex post competition after speciﬁc investments by
allowing more than one private ﬁrm to engage in providing
the goods in question.
It is diﬃcult for governments to prepare eﬀective regula-
tion before contracting out a public service because the gov-
ernments do not know exactly what would happen in the
virgin contract-out.18 Privatization may end up with ex post
monopoly if the government has no bargaining power as the
HSV presumes, despite of ex ante competitive auction of the
contract-out.
5.3 Negative Implications for a Theory of Pri-
vatization
We have derived two issues of criticism against the HSV’s uni-
lateral determination of the threat point. (1) In the case of
public goods, if skills are speciﬁc to elements other than assets
in the relationship, bargaining emerges because the govern-
ment can have bargaining power by exercising the separation
strategy as a threat. (2) In other cases, private ownership
of the contract-out implies ex post monopoly of the private
ﬁrm.
If the former happens, bargaining will take place under
the same condition under whichever ownership, as long as
the levels of speciﬁc investments are the same. This is be-
18HSV does not think that the government can avoid the ex post
monopoly situation through government regulation since Hart (2003,
p.C70) says that privatization (contract out) is diﬀerent from monopoly
under eﬀective regulation. He is opaque about what the diﬀerence is.
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cause the separation strategy guarantees each party his best
outside opportunity payoﬀ, which is independent of how the
property rights are allocated.19 It is easy to show that the
levels of speciﬁc investments are the same under both types of
ownership if the threat payoﬀs of bargaining are independent
of who has the property right of which assets in production.20
In this case, the property rights approach to privatization
makes no diﬀerence between private and public ownerships.
If the latter happens, inconsistency occurs. Ex post com-
petition after privatization is now understood as a necessary
condition for better performance of the contracting-out ﬁrm.
The ex post monopoly under the contract-out turns out to be
contradictory to this necessary condition for successful priva-
tization. This might explain why only a few private compa-
nies under the contract-out exist internationally in the ﬁelds
of water supply and private prison. An incumbent ﬁrm has
advantage to potential entrants in the presence of speciﬁc in-
vestments. Once a small number of ﬁrms win many contracts
of public service initially, these ﬁrms are likely to stay in the
contracts.
Whichever case happens, the HSV’s model is far from jus-
19Strictly speaking, this is true only when the skills speciﬁc to elements
other than assets in the relation is the only speciﬁc skill. When there
are other skills speciﬁc to only assets in production in addition to the
skills speciﬁc to elements other than assets, a party with the right to
control all assets in production can retain the yield from skills speciﬁc
to these assets even after the separation. This brings about a diﬀerence
of the threat payoﬀs, depending on how the property rights are allocated.
This situation corresponds to the case where speciﬁc investments aﬀect
a party’s best outside opportunity payoﬀ, i.e., what Segal & Whinston
(2000) call external investments.
20This is because bargaining shares are the same function of the spe-
ciﬁc investment levels under both private and public ownerships.
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tifying the property rights approach as a theory of privatiza-
tion.
6 Concluding Remarks
The property rights approach to privatization represented by
the HSV’s model presumes that allocation of the right to
control assets in production aﬀects the threat point payoﬀs
in bargaining after speciﬁc investments in the incomplete con-
tract setting. The HSV’s model supposes unilateral determi-
nation of the threat point by a party who possesses all assets
in production under private ownership. This formulation of
the threat point, however, cannot be justiﬁed by the exist-
ing theories of optimal threat. Furthermore, in the spirit of
cooperative games where Nash bargaining solution is one of
them, a pair of the maximin strategy has been used as the
threat point. A pair of the separation strategy is a natural
candidate for the optimal threat because it is compatible with
all the existing theories of the optimal threat, including the
maximin strategy theory, in the context of the HSV’s model.
Once the separation strategy is accepted as the optimal
threat, in the case of public goods, bargaining emerges from
the fact that skills are speciﬁc to some elements in the rela-
tionship rather than assets in production, even if a private
ﬁrm has the right to control all assets under private own-
ership. Since the separation strategy guarantees each party
his best outside opportunity independent of allocation of the
property rights in the relationship, we end up with no diﬀer-
ence of speciﬁc investment levels between private and public
ownerships. In such a case, the HSV’s model cannot com-
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pare private with public ownerships. In other cases, uni-
lateral determination of the threat point by a private ﬁrm
under private ownership within the incomplete contract im-
plies that the government has eventually no power to regulate
behavior of the private ﬁrm after speciﬁc investments. This
situation is equivalent to allowing the private ﬁrm to be ex
post monopoly, in spite of ex ante competitive auction of the
contract-out. Ex post monopoly after privatization is contra-
dictory to the necessary condition for successful privatization
of ex post competition. Whichever case happens, the HSV’s
model is far from satisfactory for a theory of privatization.
Some remarks and comments are in order. The other
asymmetry of the threat payoﬀ speciﬁcation in the HSV’s
model is no longer a problem once the separation is accepted
as the optimal threat strategy. Though incomplete speci-
ﬁcity appears in the form of the threat payoﬀs dependent on
speciﬁc investment levels under both private and public own-
erships, the way they depend is the same between the two
types of ownership. This is because the additional yield of
incomplete speciﬁc investments captured by a party after the
separation comes from general skills and thus is evaluated
as the opportunity cost of the assets through their compet-
itive markets. This implies that bargaining shares are the
same function of speciﬁc investment levels under both types
of ownership.21 Incomplete speciﬁcity brings about no diﬀer-
ence of performance between the two types of ownership.
Our criticism only applies to the property rights approach
to privatization. It does not apply to analysis of ﬁrm inte-
gration. There it is technological complementarity between
21The functional forms are diﬀerent from those in the case of complete
speciﬁcity discussed in the preceding sections.
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assets in production that causes bargaining with the threat
triggered by separation. There emerges no bargaining if one
party has the right to control (the property right to) all assets
in production, and ineﬃciency from the hold-up problem can
be avoided.
Hart (1995, p.57) eventually deﬁnes the property right as
broad as possible including any tangible assets such as cus-
tomer lists and the right to operate on particular routs as
well as intangible assets such as brands and reputation. His
deﬁnition of the property right appears to limit or exclude
the possibility of bargaining resulting from speciﬁcity to el-
ements other than assets in the relationship in the case of
public goods. However, applicability of his broadly deﬁned
property rights seems limited. In actuality, laws do not al-
ways cover intangible assets as the objective of the property
rights (perhaps because of high implementation cost). Gov-
ernments do not delegate to a private ﬁrm some rights to
control important items such as the number and composition
of inmates. The right to operate a bus service on particular
routs may be retained in a local government’s hand even in
the contract with a private bus company. Even if a company
has a list of customers, it does not necessarily mean that the
company can exclusively control behavior of these customers.
The broad deﬁnition of the property rights is not acceptable
as a positive theory on the basis of which we should construct
a model of privatization to compare private with public own-
erships. Note that we will end up with ex post monopoly even
if we allow for the broad deﬁnition of the property rights.
We have made no legal argument on the property rights
approach in this paper. The common law, including the
property rights law, is designed so as to enhance economic
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eﬃciency, according to Posner (1998, p.27). It is a common-
place that there are many countries where the continental
law is applied and that the common law is diﬀerent from the
continental law in terms of how to understand and interpret
the property rights. We should be careful not to jump to the
property rights approach (to privatization) proposed by HSV
when it is applied to any country other than the Common
Wealth and the United States. Legal analysis of the prop-
erty rights approach to privatization is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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